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Culture does account for variation in
game behavior
Lamba and Mace’s critique (1) of our research (2–4) is based on
incorrect claims about our experiments and several mis-
understandings of the theory underpinning our efforts. Their
ﬁndings are consistent with our previous work and lead to no
unique conclusions.
Lambda and Mace (1) incorrectly claimed that we “mostly”
sampled from single communities within sites, and that we ig-
nored “ecological” and “demographic” variables. In fact, much
of our work focused on studying the variation among commu-
nities within sites. In phase I (2), 8 of 15 sites involved multiple
communities, and in phase II (3, 4), 11 of our 16 sites sampled
from multiple communities. Several sites included 5 communi-
ties*, and 1 site included 9 communities (5).
During both phases, we conducted analyses like Lamba and
Mace’s (1) within each of our sites (2–4). Except for community
size, which emerged as a focal predictor (4), we studied versions
of all the key variables (age, network centrality, and siblings) of
Lamba and Mace (1) in some populations. Occasionally, these
were signiﬁcant, but none had consistent effects across pop-
ulations, games, or in retests years later. Lamba and Mace (1)
also failed to ﬁnd any predictors that were consistent across
their experiments, despite trying dozens of variables. Moreover,
their predictors are neither theoretically well-grounded nor
particularly ecological. Nonetheless, Lamba and Mace (1) con-
cluded that “ecology drives variation in cooperation.”
Our analyses show that the key claim of Lamba and Mace (1),
that the fraction of variation they observed for monetary games
(4%) among communities is comparable to the fraction we ob-
serve among our sites (12% for ultimatum game offers in phase
I) is not correct, even allowing for their assumption that 12 ≈ 4.
Table 1 partitions the variation for ﬁve game measures from
phase II (3). The variation among communities within sites [what
Lamba and Mace (1) calculated] is always smaller than the
variation among sites. Lamba and Mace’s estimate of 4% within
their site (1) is consistent with our data, but their data tell us
nothing about the variation across sites (contrary to their claim).
Our theoretical framework is also not made clear, because
Lamba and Mace (1) claimed that our approach holds that only
norms matter, and that norms cannot evolve in response to eco-
logical variation. They further imply that if demographic or eco-
logical variation is important, norms cannot be. Our research is
based on the idea that people can acquire context-speciﬁc ex-
pectations (e.g., “one wife per man”) and internalized motiva-
tions (e.g., “extramarital sex is wrong”) as a consequence of
cultural learning. These expectations and motivations then in-
ﬂuence their decision making along with other factors, including
evolved motivations linked to self-interest and genetic relatedness
(2). Thus, as conditions vary, so too does behavior, even if people
share such norms.*
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Table 1. Partitions of variance for phase II data
Game measures Across sites, %
Across communities
within sites, %
DG Offers 10.5 4.5
UG Offers 23.5 3.0
TPG Offers 10 4.3
UG MAO 29.5 1.8
TPG MAO 37.9 2.8
DG, dictator game; MAO, minimum accept offer; TPG, third party punish-
ment game; UG, ultimatum game.
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